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CHARACTER OF THE FEMININE IN
LÉVINAS AND THE DAODEJING
Introduction
I shall start this article with a prominent issue contemporary feminists
seem to be faced with: Would the writings stressing the specificities of
woman reinscribe traditional dichotomy between woman and man?
Would feminist claims to women’s equal rights end up with advocat-
ing gynocentrism in place of androcentrism? Traditional feminine–
masculine dichotomy has been commonly related to paternal
hierarchy, but now the reinscription of this dichotomy is associated to
what is called gynocentric feminism or matriarchal dominance. From
this standpoint, feminist claims to equal rights are seen to entail a
reversion of women and men’s status without a substantial change of
the hierarchical social structure. Another version of criticism is sug-
gested in the comment that Western feminism has been moving in the
direction of promoting female to the status of an honorary male,
which may cause gender sameness. In this light, gynocentrism would
be little more than an alias of androcentrism, which, paradoxically,
implies the final surrender of women to men.
All these comments and criticisms reveal the predicament of
Western feminism today. In my view, the skepticism that feminist
theorization and practice would not necessarily lead to a real demise
of women’s subordination derives from a misunderstanding of the
feminist movement, and more primarily, from a misunderstanding of
how the difference of woman from man should be conceived. This
predicament constitutes the background against which some Chinese
philosophers working in the West argue that it is both naïve and
ethnocentric to suppose that Chinese women will be saved from their
own oppression by Western solutions. Admittedly, the concerns and
problems of women issues differ in different continents or countries,
but there is not a dichotomy that justifies the isolation of similar
efforts conducted in different places.
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Through an examination of relevant themes in the work of
Emmanuel Lévinas and in the Daodejing , this article
attempts to articulate a philosophy of the feminine that would
provide a horizon in which women’s specificities could be considered
in their own right and in which equality feminism and feminism
of difference could be appreciated in light of a new philosophical
orientation.
I. Lévinas’s Critics
Lévinas is one of the very few philosophers who have incorporated
the feminine into their intellectual endeavor. However, his writings in
this connection have been frequently subject to continuous question-
ings and sharp criticisms. Simone de Beauvoir is celebrated as the first
critic of Lévinas. In Le deuxième sexe, she initiates groundbreaking
accusation of traditional modes of theorization in accordance with
which woman is defined in terms of what man lacks. Man represents
subject, essence, and the Absolute, while woman cannot enjoy the
status of self but is rather nonessential, contingent, and relative. Thus,
“humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as
relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being.”1 In this
context, Beauvoir cites at length Lévinas’s Le temps et l’autre (1947)
as a typical representation of this long-standing prejudice against
women in Western philosophical tradition, in which the feminine is
described as “the absolutely contrary contrary (le contraire absolute-
ment contraire), whose contrariety is in no way affected by the rela-
tionship that can be established between it and its correlative, the
contrariety that permits its terms to remain absolutely other.”2
Beauvoir charges that Lévinas “deliberately takes a man’s point of
view without referring to (signaler) the reciprocity of subject and
object” and concludes that his description “is in fact an assertion of
masculine privilege.”3 The reasons for her objections are two. One is
related to his ascription of the category of the Other to the feminine.
For Beauvoir, this practice is in line with the androcentric tradition in
which woman “is defined and differentiated with reference to man.”4
Woman’s otherness is absolute in the sense that her subordination is
not the result of a historical event or a social change, but rather “lacks
the contingent or incidental nature of historical facts.”5 It is absolute
in the sense of a given natural condition that seems to be immutable
and beyond the possibility of change. As will be shown in the next
section, however, Lévinas’s notion of the Other is entirely different
from Beauvoir’s understanding.
The other reason for Beauvoir’s objection has to do with Lévinas’s
characterization of woman as “mystery.” She takes the implication of
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this to be that woman is mystery for man. For her, traditional descrip-
tion of femininity as the “mysterious and threatened reality,” which is
associated with the theory of the eternal feminine, entails the idea that
femininity either constitutes an unchangeable Platonic essence or is
determined by a special physiological organ, namely, the ovary.6
However, Lévinas’s invocation of “mystery” serves a completely dif-
ferent purpose.
In the year 1949, Lévinas was still a relatively unknown author, and
most of his important works were not yet published. Therefore, it is
understandable that Beauvoir cited some passages from Time and the
Other as exemplification of stereotypical description of woman as the
other relative to man, without considering their real significance in
the context of Lévinas’s thought. However, Lévinas remained to be
the target of other authors from the 1980s onward. Like Beauvoir,
Luce Irigaray ascribes androcentrism to Lévinas.7
In French, the word for “lover” has only masculine form, that is,
amant, while the word for “the beloved” takes feminine form, that is,
aimée. Irigaray employs the word l’amante to indicate the fact that
woman is not merely an object of love, but can be a subject of love (un
subjet amoreux) and an agent of action.8 For her, the description of
woman as the passive beloved has degraded the status of woman. In
Lévinas’s phenomenology of eros, woman functions as the necessary
condition for man’s attaining ethical transcendence; nevertheless, she
is ultimately ignored and excluded from the genuine ethical relation.
While admitting that Lévinas’s reflection upon the feminine opens up
certain possibilities for further development, Irigaray thinks that
these possibilities are unfortunately closed up by himself. Therefore,
the figuration of the feminine in his philosophical discourse does not
exceed traditional prejudice. Ultimately speaking, Irigaray argues, the
feminine plays only a marginal role in Lévinas’s philosophy; he does
not really include sexual difference into the fundament of his philoso-
phy of the Other.
Irigaray’s view has been widely shared by many commentators. In
recent years, Stella Sanford raises criticisms from a different angle,
yet a criticism no less severe than Beauvoir and Irigaray’s. According
to her, the relation between philosophical category and empirical
content is the criterion for assessing whether Lévinas has made con-
tribution to feminism. However, he has never explicated whether or
not these two aspects are related in his philosophy, and if they are, of
what nature this connection is. Neither has Lévinas ever considered
the question what kind of relation is required of them in order to
make a positive contribution to the feminist enterprise.9 In the view
of Sanford, the feminine in Lévinas’s corpus is primarily a philo-
sophical category that does not bear upon women in real life; there-
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fore, his discourse on the feminine has nothing fruitful to offer to
feminism.
Sanford’s concern is primarily with feminism as a social-political
movement. However, philosophical thematization upon the feminine
is not equivalent with a social-political movement with concrete steps
and distinctive objectives. The role it can play is to provide appropri-
ate milieu in which feminist movement can be facilitated. It is true
that Lévinas’s text is highly abstract and speculative, but we cannot
therefore deny his concern with feminist issues. In French, the word
for woman “la femme” is etymologically related to “le féminin,” and
Lévinas uses these words interchangeably.
II. The Absolute Alterity of the Feminine
The early Lévinas finds fruitful resource for his thinking on the Other
in the role of the feminine as thematized through eros, a fundamental
dimension of human existence. One of the earliest figurations of the
feminine occurs in Existence and Existents. Lévinas writes,
[T]he plane of eros allows us see that the Other par excellence is the
feminine, through which a world behind the scenes prolongs the
world. In Plato, Love [sic], a child of need, retains the features of
destitution. Its negativity is the simple “less” of need, and not the very
movement unto alterity. Eros, when separated from the Platonic
interpretation which completely fails to recognize the role of the
feminine, can be the theme of a philosophy which, detached from the
solitude of light, and consequently from phenomenology properly
speaking, will concern us elsewhere.10
It is clear that Lévinas’s discussion is paralleled by an opposition to
Plato’s view of eros. In Symposium, Plato tells such a story: In the
beginning of history, human beings were of one integral body with
their lovers. They offended the gods, and gods out of rage split
them into half as punishment. From then on, mankind is doomed to
roaming around the globe in search of the other half.11 Therefore, the
origin of eros is lack, a lack in constant need that can never be
satisfied.
In the view of Lévinas, the Platonic account of eros “completely
fails” to take into account the role of the feminine as the Other par
excellence. Instead, the feminine seems to be considered to be some-
thing of a material character that can only temporarily alleviate, but
never meet the insatiable need of eros. For Lévinas, this philosophy of
love remains within the domain of immanency and does not account
for love as “the very movement unto alterity.”
As Lévinas states in the Preface to Existence and Existents, the
study carried out in that book is “a preparatory one” and its aim is to
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provide an overview of a number of “broader research topics.”12 It is
in the section of “Eros” in the fourth part of Time and the Other that
Lévinas explicates his thoughts on the feminine at length. For him, the
legendary story of searching for the other half embodies the idea that
sexual duality consists in two complementary terms, and this duality
would disappear when the two terms come into fusion. Against this
idea, Lévinas insists that sexual duality is insurmountable, and that a
loving relation does not dissolve the alterity of the feminine but
rather preserves it.
Lévinas opposes himself not only against Plato’s account of eros
but also against his own account of the other.According to Plato’s law
of participation, every term contains a self-sameness and through this
sameness contains the other. The other is that which is not the same-
ness of the term.Therefore, it is the reverse side of the same, and is the
negation of the same. Nevertheless, the same and the other are cor-
related through what defines the same. Lévinas puts forward a novel
account of the Other, and this Other is incarnated in the feminine. He
attempts to articulate a sense of alterity that is defined neither in
terms of negativity and contradiction, nor in terms of conflict and
opposition, nor in terms of neutral reciprocity and complementarity,
that is, the Other is not to be determined in relation to anything else.
For Lévinas, all these accounts of the other fail to convey the
“absolutely contrary contrary” (le contraire absolutement con-
traire).”13 He spares no efforts in trying to transmit an idea of the
Other that is to be described in terms of positivity and essence, that is,
the Other is not something that can only be made sense of in relation
to another term, no matter what the nature of this relation is: Conflict,
opposition, or cooperation, harmony, but rather is something primary
and primordial. In the preface to the second edition of Time and the
Other, Lévinas emphasizes that the feminine is difference propre:
The notion of a transcendent alterity—one that opens time—is at
first sought starting with an alterity-content (altérité-contenu)—that is,
starting with femininity. Femininity . . . appeared to me as a differ-
ence contrasting strongly with other differences, not merely as a
quality different from all others, but as the very quality of
difference.14
The feminine does not mark a difference among many differences, but
is difference itself. In an interview of 1981, Lévinas speaks of the
feminine as “the of itself Other, as the origin of the very concept of
alterity.”15 The feminine as difference itself is absolute and cannot be
incorporated into the sameness of totality.
Presumably, instead of applying his philosophy of the Other to the
thematization on the feminine, which is the most of what a favorable
reading would grant, a serious reflection upon the feminine has
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provided inexhaustible resources for Lévinas’s unprecendented chal-
lenge against traditional Western philosophy of univocity as founded
by Parmenides. In light of the philosophy of univocity, Being (and
essence) is one and can only be one. Against this tradition, Lévinas
takes sexual difference as the difference par excellence that “carves up
reality in another sense and conditions the very possibility of reality
as multiple.”16 Sexual difference does not collapse but becomes mani-
fest when the two terms are joined together. In this sense, Lévinas
speaks of sexual difference as a “formal structure.”17
Eros is a central touching point in Lévinas’s meditation on the
feminine. It should be noted that eros for him is not just a means for
attaining ethical transcendence. Lévinas writes:
This idea should make the notion of the couple as distinct as possible
from every purely numerical duality. The notion of the sociality of
two, which is probably necessary for the exceptional epiphany of the
face—abstract and chaste nudity—emerges from sexual differences,
and is essential to eroticism and to all instances of alterity—again as
quality and not as a simply logical distinction—borne by the “thou
shalt not kill” that the very silence of the face says. Here is a signifi-
cant ethical radiance within eroticism and the libido. Through it
humanity enters into the society of two and sustains it, authorizes it,
perhaps, at least putting into question the simplicity of contemporary
paneroticism.18
While advocating the sublimity of ethical transcendence, Lévinas
attempts to demonstrate that, at what is normally considered to be
the most mundane level, that is, libido (i.e., eros), there is already
manifest a “significant ethical radiance.” Eros is not something that
can be “sublated,” so to speak, after ethical transcendence is
attained. The feminine is not merely an ancilla who helps man enter
into genuine ethical relations. One cannot impose, as Irigaray does,
such a quasi-Hegelian reading on Lévinas. To the contrary, Lévinas
holds that the two of sociality as rooted in the two of sexual differ-
ence do not coalesce as one in eros, but become two in the authentic
sense. The essence of love is separation in the positive sense of
the word. The feminine is not only the necessary condition for
achieving ethical transcendence, but the best manifestation of
ethical relation.
Lévinas’s reflection upon eros is set against Freudian doctrines.
According to him, Freud makes eros central to his thoughts, but he
fails to provide an apposite and detailed analysis of eros. Freud claims
that libido seeks pleasure, but he does not explore the significance of
libido in the general structure of existence.19 In view of this, Lévinas
states that his aim is to account for the exceptional role of libido, that
is, eros, in showing that even at the most blind and crude level of eros,
the proximity of the Other is already at play. He attempts to demon-
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strate that sociality is functioning in eros, sociality in the sense of the
genuine two, in the sense of the manifestation of genuine ethical
relation.
In Totality and Infinity, Lévinas characterizes the feminine in terms
of the Beloved (Aimée). He stresses that the epiphany of the Beloved,
or the feminine, does not occur in the neuter as defined by the sole
gender formal logic. She manifests herself at the limit of being and
nonbeing.20 This characterization of the feminine as the Beloved has
to be understood in parallel to Lévinas’s insistence that his remarks
such as the feminine is the Other, is the mystery, cannot be understood
in relation to literally similar Romantic sayings, and that his citations
from literary works by writers such as Goethe, Dante, and Bloy only
serve the purpose of illustrating the unique and fundamental status
of women in the structure of existence, and he does not have any
pretension to identify his claim of mystery with facile Romantic
imagination.21 In terms of mystery, Lévinas means something more
fundamental. It is related to the irreducible alterity of the feminine
that resists the complete knowing of absolute knowledge.22 Apart
from his thematization of the feminine in terms of eros, Lévinas
highlights the role of women in social life. Because of limit of space, I
cannot engage in a detailed discussion.
III. Three Major Readings of the Feminine in the DAODEJING
The words that are associated with the feminine in the Daodejing are
three: ci (versus xiong ), pin (versus mu2 ), mu (versus fu
).23 Ci and pin more often refer to animals, but in traditional
Chinese poetry, prose, and set phrases, they are also used with regard
to women. For a Daoist, the human female is contiguous with the
female part of other species because all things (wanwu ) are one.
A Western feminist would not normally think of relating woman to
the female part of animals. But in English, the same word “female” is
used with reference to both human beings and animals.
Because of the prevalence of the figuration of the feminine, Daoist
philosophy has often been characterized as “feminine” in terms of its
orientation.The most prominent advocate of this interpretation is the
famous historian Joseph Needham. For him, the feminine symbolism
in tandem with the water metaphor and other highlights on the soft
and weak reflect an emphasis on all that is “tolerant, yielding, permis-
sive, withdrawing, mystical and receptive,” and calls for feminine
yieldingness in human, social, and political relations.24 In my view,
Needham’s delineation of Daoism as feminine has some limitations
due to a concern with history, especially when he suggests that primi-
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tive Chinese society “was in all probability matriarchal.”25 I shall call
his interpretation a “quasi-feminist historical reading.”
Roger T.Ames opposes to the characterization of Daoism as “femi-
nine.” In his opinion, the references to femininity have to be under-
stood in light of a positive Daoist ideal of the consummate human
being who is androgynous. In this human being, “the masculine and
feminine gender traits are integrated in some harmonious and bal-
anced relationship.”26 This equilibrium and harmony is achieved by
means of reconciliation of the tension between these two opposites.
Ames’s effort to attribute equal significance to the masculine and the
feminine is close to Karyn Lai’s attempt to apply her understanding of
the Daoist notion of complementarity to the relation between femi-
ninity and masculinity. According to her, femininity and masculinity
are interdependent, mutually inclusive, and in the meantime remain
distinct and are irreducible to each other.27 I shall call this interpre-
tation a “correlative reading.” In my view, one of the major motiva-
tions for Ames’s objection to Needham’s quasi-feminist reading has
to do with an inadequate understanding of the essence of a feminist
orientation. Ames writes:
I argue that any emphasis on the “feminine” is entirely compensa-
tory, and that a failure to appreciate this has resulted in a persistent
reading to Taoism as passive, quietistic, negative, naturalistic (as
opposed to humanistic), escapist, pessimistic, and so on.28
This characterization identifies feminist outlook on the world as a
retreat from the world, which is based upon an unquestioned assump-
tion of the world as masculine and positive.
Liu Xiaogan’s explication of Laozi’s verses bearing upon the femi-
nine proceeds primarily from a consideration of how to govern the
world.29 This interpretation is in continuity with the classical Hanfei
reading of the Daodejing, which maintains that the ci-based tech-
niques are invoked for the purpose of accomplishing the xiong-
inspired end of political control. I shall call this approach a “political
reading.” Liu insists that the principle of “abiding by the female” is a
piece of admonishment to men, who are strong and who are the
rulers.30 It is for the purpose of successfully handling social and
political affairs in the world that this principle should be upheld.31
In light of this “political reading,” the objectives and the agents of
action are masculine in nature, while feminist virtues are invoked as a
strategy for achieving the ultimate goal. When a woman came into
power in rare cases, as an agent of action she has become masculine in
essence.32
Both the “correlative reading” and the “political reading,” in my
view, presuppose a consensus that endeavor and achievement in the
world, which is often masqueraded as “the positive and the neutral,”
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is masculine in nature and does not belong to the feminine.33 On
the other hand, Needham’s “quasi-feminist historical reading” fails to
give sufficient consideration to the significance of the feminine in her
own right. This opens possibility for his interpretation to collapse into
the other two readings.
IV. The Principle of Abiding by the Female
I shall argue that the feminine occupies a central place in the Daode-
jing. This centrality is not to be defined through a relation to the
masculine, either in terms of a harmonious and complementary rela-
tion, or in terms of mutual contradiction and dictinctiveness from one
another, or in terms of a combination of both facets. Ames describes
the combination of these two facets as integration through reconcili-
ation, which in fact serves to downplay the importance of the feminine
in the Daodejing.34 While Lai shows alertness regarding a reduction or
assimilation of femininity to masculinity, in listing all the imaginable
features of the connection between the two as two symmetrical
members, she stops short of analyzing the very nature of this irreduc-
ibility of the feminine.35 I shall attempt to bring D. C. Lau’s insight
regarding the relation of opposites to bear upon the theme of the
feminine.
In his article “The Treatment of Opposites in Lao Tzu,” D. C. Lau
raises objections to the usual interpretation concerning the relation
between two parties of a pair of opposites.36 The typical opposite
terms he gives as examples are short (duan ) and long (chang ),
soft (rou ) and hard (gang ), weak (ruo ) and strong (qiang ),
and he calls the first words in each pair the “lower” terms, and the
second words the “higher” terms.37 I shall use both terms in the
following for the sake of facility of our discussion. Lau’s thesis is
set forth in opposition to what I call a “quasi-Hegelian dialectical
reading” of the Daodejing. Scholars such as Feng Youlan, Yang Kuan,
Yang Rongguo, and Hu Shi have described the movements between
two opposite terms as a circular process, in which each term trans-
forms into its opposite by reversion, conquering, or generation.
According to Lau, these scholars have mistakenly assimilated appar-
ently similar passages from the Laozi to those in the Yijing .38
In fact, there are importance differences between these two scrip-
tures. In the Yijing, there are often a pair of terms that signify move-
ment in opposite directions. Taken together, these two kinds of
movement form a cycle and so suggest a processs of circular change.
Yet what can be ascribed to Laozi is not more than this:
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[W]hen a thing develops to the higher limit, it will necessarily reverse
and begin to decline, but it is not stated that when a thing is at, or
reaches, the lower limit, it will necessarily develop all the way to the
higher limit.39
What is necessary is only one specific movement called return ( fu
) or reversion ( fan ), which is from the higher limit to the lower
limit. On the other hand, there is not a telos engrained in the lower
terms that would necessitate a movment toward the higher terms.
Therefore, there is not a process of circular change between the lower
and higher terms. The formulation of Lau’s thesis is not focused upon
the opposite of ci and xiong. However, his insight applies very well,
perhaps the best, to the opposites of ci and xiong, pin and mu2. As a
matter of fact, the primordiality of the feminine for Lau seems to be
a most obvious idea embodied in the Daodejing. In citing from “know
the male, abide by the female” of chapter 28, he describes “valuing the
soft” and “abiding by the soft” as the “best authenticated theory” that
can be attributed to Laozi. In order to support this view, he cites from
comments in the Zhuangzi , the Xunzi , and Lüshi
Chunqiu , which unanimously state that Laozi values the
soft.40 Lau uses this very principle to serve vindication for his thesis
concerning the noncircular nature of the movements between oppo-
site terms. He argues:
If all things undergo a perpetual course of circular change, from the
lower to the higher and from the higher to the lower, the injunction
“abide by the soft” becomes idle advice. . . . Indeed it will be impos-
sible to abide by anything, for everything will inexorably change to its
opposite. In other words in a world of ceaseless change, one cannot
stop but has to move with the stream, and in such a world it will be
futile to give advice as to what one should abide by.41
In light of Lau’s explication, it becomes easier for us to appreciate
Laozi’s accentuation upon the lower terms.42
Another significant point Lau makes bears upon the statement that
the soft and weak overcomes the hard and strong.43 In accordance
with the idea of circular process, the soft would become the strong
when it overcomes the latter. Lau argues that the lower and higher
terms are not two sides internal to a unity, which refer to whatever
side that is at an advantegeous or disadvantegeous position. This is
because, if this should be the case, then there is not a definite soft side
that we can abide by. For Lau, the conflict between the lower and
higher is “an external conflict between one thing which is weak and
another thing which is strong.”44 The opposite terms in the Daodejing
are not two sides internal to a thing within its own unity, but are
externally recognizable and determinable. A correlative reading of
the figuration of the feminine has the danger of taking femininity and
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masculinity as two sides within a unity and thus neutralizes and
obscures the thrust of Laozi’s verses concerning the central impor-
tance of the feminine. The feminine bears upon women in the empiri-
cal sense but is not restricted to that. With respect to dao, it could be
said that dao is feminine in nature instead of an unsexed origin that
comprehends the feminine and masculine.45
Furthermore, Lau points out that the victory of the soft over the
hard is not one in the ordinary sense, but is true victory.This is because
the soft always remains to be preserved by means of noncontention
(buzheng ) (and letting-it-be [wuwei ]) and is not visited by
defeat in turn, while the victor in the ordinary sense will surely meet
his/her match one day and be defeated.46 A good textual support for
Lau’s point, I think, can be found in chapter 43: “The softest thing in
the world can ride roughshod over the hardest in the world. . . . That
is why I know the benefit of letting-it-be.” Laozi does not state that
abiding by the soft is ultimately at the service of the hard, or of
becoming the hard. Therefore, the principle of abiding by the soft/
female is not set forth as a means to end of the hard/male. In this light,
the political reading of the feminine misses Laozi’s point to a large
extent.
V. CI , PIN , MU , and YIN in the DAODEJING
In the following I take a look at the occurrences of ci, pin, mu, and yin
in the Daodejing. Ci appears twice in chapter 10 and 28, respectively:
“When the gates of heaven open and shut, are you capable of keeping
to the role of the female (ci)?”;“know the male, keep to the role of the
female (ci), and be a ravine to the empire”. Pin appears four times in
chapters 6, 55, and 61:“The spirit of the valley never dies.This is called
the mysterious female (pin). The gateway of the mysterious female, is
called the root of heaven and earth”; “One who has an abundance of
virture (de ) is like a newborn child: . . . It has not known the union
of woman (pin) and man (mu2 ), but its organs get aroused”;“In the
union of the world, the female (pin) always gets the better of the male
(mu2) by stillness”.47 It can be seen that, in all the verses where ci and
pin appear (except the one from chapter 55), there is a clear stress on
the role of the female. In chapter 10, ci appears without xiong. Since
the phrasing in this chapter is almost the same as that in chapter 28,
the verses in the latter chapter make perfect sense without any refer-
ence to xiong.
The occurrence of the word mu has the highest number. It occurs
seven times in five chapters, and never together with what is assumed
to be its opposite, the word fu : “The nameless was the beginning of
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heaven and earth; The named was the mother of the ten thousand
things”; “I alone am different from others, and value being fed by the
mother”; “There is a thing confusedly formed, born before heaven
and earth. Silent and void, it stands alone and does not change, goes
round and does not weary. It is capable of being the mother of the
world.” “The world had a beginning, and this beginning could be the
mother of the world”;48 “When he possesses the mother of a state, he
can then endure.”49 In addition, in “The Great One Gives Birth to the
Waters” (Taiyi Shengshui ) of Laozi of the Guodian
edition, the word mu occurs once: “completing a cycle, the Great One
starts over again, making herself the mother of the ten thousand
things.”50 The frequency of the occurrence of mu is amazing and
impressive compared with the fact that the word fu appears only once
in chapter 42: “I shall take this as my precept ( jiaofu ).”51
The word yin (versus yang ) has often been associated with the
feminine in some other contexts. It occurs only once in chapter 42 of
the Daodejing: “The myriad things shoulder the yin and embrace the
yang, and blending this qi , they attain harmony.” Ames cites this
passage as a key support for his “correlative reading.”52 It is true that
an idea of complementarity of yin and yang seems to be embodied
here, and this verse lends to the political reading as well. However,
even Liu, the strongest advocate for the political reading, explicates
that Laozi does not use yinyang to refer to women and men. This is
because these words are more closely related to natural phenomena
and thus are too abstract and general to be assocated with human
affairs.53 What is to be noted is that yin and yang appear five times in
“The Great One Gives Birth to the Waters.” It is stated that the
spiritual and numinous, in assisting each another, produces yin and
yang; and in repeatedly assisting each other, yin and yang produce the
four seasons. It is also stated that the eternal movement of the Great
One (Taiyi ), who makes herself the mother of ten thousand
things, is not something that yin and yang can bring to closure.54 It is
clear that, compared with all other words bearing upon the feminine,
yin has the remotest association with the feminine in the particular text
of the Daodejing, and the idea of complementarity embodied in
chapter 42 is a different thing from the principle of abiding by the
female.
As stated in the foregoing, mu is the only word that never occurs in
relation to her opposite. Incontrovertibly, this attests to the primacy
Laozi attributes to the feminine. Scholars such as Ames try to down-
play the importance of the figure of mother by describing her as an
“impregnated woman,” which means “a union of the masculine and
the feminine.”55 There are two objections to this reduction. First, that
a woman is in pregnancy does not detract from her femininity at all.
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The capacity and actuality of motherhood is not what alone warrants
a woman to be referrred as mother. Relating a pregnant woman to the
masculine risks reducing women to a means of producing progeny,
the son (who is masculine). Presumably, it is not only because of the
capacity of pregnancy that Laozi accentuates the femimine. Second,
among all the chapters where mu occurs, there is only one place in
chapter 20 where she is actually a feeding mother. On all the other
occasions, mu is referred to as the origin, source, and guardian of the
ten thousand things, which appears to be a metaphorical invocation.
However, this can in no way weaken the centrality of mu, which is
consonant with the principle of abiding by the female.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Hopefully, we can now revisit the questions raised in the Introduction.
Our answer is: First, there should be no worry that writings focusing
on women’s specificities, which genre of writing belongs to feminist
philosophy, again set up a dichotomy between woman and man, as
long as these writings do not proceed from man’s perspective and
interests, but attempt to present women as they are. Elaborating on
women’s specific characteristics would be immune from the charge of
essentialism, provided that this elaboration is not governed by stereo-
typical modes of thinking and does not take itself as absolute,
provided that this elaboration does not aim at endorsing women’s
confinement to specific social roles traditionally considered to be in
harmony with those specificities. Were these basic provisos not taken
care of, feminist philosophy would lose its point.
Second, the claims to women’s equal rights, which belong to femi-
nism as a social-political movement, are of a negative nature in the
main in that these claims are primarily concerned with those rights
denied to women on the sole basis of their sex. There has been
significant improvement of women’s status in the West; however, in
most developing countries, women’s situation remains to be deplor-
able. There is not a solid basis for a worry about so-called gynocen-
trism, since demands are made only for those things that have been
unfairly rendered inaccessible to women.
Compared with the negative nature of feminism, and with the
tendency toward neutrality of intellectualism of feminist philosophy,
philosophy of the feminine takes one step further. It attempts to
articulate the characteristics and role of women in a positive sense.
From Lévinas, we learn to consider women’s specificities in their
proper otherness and to dispose the immanence of masculine–
feminine duality, either in terms of their opposition, conflict, and or in
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terms of their mutual dependence, reciprocity, and harmony. Resort-
ing to the principle of abiding by the female in the Daodejing, this
philosohy attempts to reorient our conception of the world and of the
ways in which we pursue our goals in it. Its goal is not a simplistic
reversal of woman and man’s status. Rather, it aims to cultivate a
horizon of thinking that no longer takes hierarchy and contention as
central. When such a horizon is opened, the quarrel between what is
sometimes called feminism of difference and equality feminism will
be shown to be unnecessary, since women’s specificities are not to be
used to justify their restriction to specific social roles, and the efforts
of the latter does not entail that women should become an honorary
male. In such a way, both genres of feminism may come to realize
more clearly what they share.
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